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Abstract

Contrary to the common notion that Muslims are fundamentalist, anti-modern, and against
Western norms (hence their opposition to secularism), this paper argues that Muslims are not
homogeneous. Therefore, their approach to secularism is not a matter of their assumed fixed
religiosity. One recognises that, after seeing the Ahmadiyya Muslim community endorsing secular
values in Canada, the assumption that Muslims coming to the West are anti-secular is misleading.
The community’s persecution and loss of religious identity in Pakistan have moderated their
approach toward secularism. To prove the hypothesis, Ahmadiyya teachings, addresses by living
caliphs, and public statements from Ahmadiyya leaders are used to highlight changes in the
community’s approaches toward secularism. The argument is based on the rise of Islamic
nationalism in Pakistan, which excluded Ahmadis from the fold of Islam and placed them on the
path of persecution. Brief comparative case studies of Alevis and Ismailis are included to
strengthen the findings of this paper.

Keywords: Muslims, Ahmadiyya, Ahmadis, homogeneous, heterogeneous, persecution,
secularism, Pakistan, Canada,
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1.

Introduction

Canada feels proud of having the highest number of foreign-born citizens than in any other Group
of Eight (G8) countries. By opening doors to immigration and any persecuted communities across
the world, Canada has created a society of mixed religions. It respects the religious and cultural
values of diverse segments of its society, having the separation of state and religion at the core of
its policy. Among multiple religions, Islam remains part of controversial debates about the extent
to which Muslims endorse secular values. After 9/11, a community-based study of Canadian
Muslim women reported anger and fear of a backlash, personal safety, and the future of their
children in Canada. The participants raised concerns about their sense of belonging in Canada
based on their religion. The Hérouxville Code of Conduct and statements of different Canadians
before Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences
(Bouchard-Taylor Commission) in 2007 reflected the perception of the majority Canadians, who
see Muslims as a challenge to secularism and gender equality, which are considered an integral
part of “Quebec’s national identity” (Dawson and Bramadat 2014, 147-48). Liberal MP Iqra
Khalid, an immigrant from Pakistan, introduced Motion 103 in 2016 for the condemnation of
Islamophobia and a climate of fear and hate against Muslims. In response the motion, Iqra received
over 50,000 emails, including highly offensive, Islamophobic, racist, threatening, and sexist
comments (Zine, Chakroun, and Abbas 2019, 4). The perception of incompatibility of secular
values with Muslim beliefs often becomes part of the discussion. Muslim beliefs are considered
obstacles to their integration.
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This controversial debate about Muslims in Canada aligns with the same debate taking
place all over the West. Since 2001, there are calls from different quarters to limit multiculturalism
in general and Islamic practices in particular for being ‘contrary’ to Western values. The French
niqab ban in 2010, the U.S. ban on several Muslim-majority countries in 2017, and the Quebec
ban on face coverings and religious symbols in 2017 and 2019 were steps taken by state institutions
to bring some religious practices ‘in line with Western values’. Casanova (2007) points toward
debates accusing Islam of being fundamentalist, anti-modern, and incompatible with democracy.
These steps, like many others, reflect the concerns the West has over Muslims’ ‘inability’ to
endorse secularism.
Muslims are assumed to be homogeneous. Regardless of ethnicity, religious denomination,
language, race, and culture, they are given one identity: Muslims. In this paper, I am challenging
this notion of Muslims ‘homogeneity’. Rogers Brubaker’s observations is very useful here. He
consider Muslims not as “a homogeneous and solidarity group”. Instead, he says, they are “a
heterogeneous category” (Brubaker 2013, 6). It is misleading to consider Muslim immigrants as a
single group, they have different ethnic backgrounds, religious denominations, economic
conditions, cultures, and languages. Many Muslims in the West consider religiosity to be part of
their identity, even many of them are irreligious. Their family background, sense of belonging,
and social environment, among other things, can be reasons for this identity. Casanova finds that
Muslims in North America are diverse as immigrants from South Asia, Arab countries, and West
Africa are unable to transform into a single Muslim ummah (2007, 19). There are congregational
segregations and doctrinal differences among them. If they do not mix with other types of Muslims,
their degree of endorsement toward secular institutions cannot be alike.
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In this paper, I intend to investigate the relationship between secularism and the
Ahmadiyya Muslim Community in Canada, which, over time, has established a presence in almost
all major cities. This study aims to answer the question of whether identity loss and belonging to
a religious persecuted community affect the degree of support of secularism. I will present findings
of brief comparative studies on Alevis and Ismailis, both religious communities persecuted in their
countries of origin, to support my argument. I base my argument on the rise of Islamic nationalism
in Pakistan that excluded Ahmadis from the fold of Islam and put them on the course of
persecution. I suggest that Ahmadis’ belonging to a persecuted religious community increases their
support for secular institutions not only in their origin country but also in the country where they
migrate to or take refuge in. I do not mean to challenge the general perception of the inverse
relationship between religiosity and the support for secularism. I want to suggest that communitylevel religiosity can produce positive feelings toward secular values because of its belonging to a
persecuted minority. I argue that victimized at the hands of religious setups and persecution on the
basis of religion leads to endorse a secular view of institutions with the hope of protection. It is
essential to mention that the focus of my study is on a part of the broader concept of secularism.
To measure the approaches of three persecuted Muslim minorities, I have focused on the separation
of state and religion, the freedom to practice religion, and the non-interference of the state in
religious matters. Alfred Stepan defines this concept of secularism as “twin toleration”, where
democratic institutions, as well as different religions, have sufficient place to exercise their
freedom without interference in each other’s domain. In such a pattern, religious institutions
neither have the constitutional prerogative to influence the functioning of democratically elected
representatives, nor it can deny freedoms to any citizens (Stepan 2011, 114–16). Talal Asad takes
this concept of twine toleration further and considers role of a democratic religion essential in

4

modern society. He finds democratic religion in consistence with modernity to promote public
debate like in the US. Such religion plays a positive political role in democracy, but it becomes
threatening if it enters political debate “on its own terms” like in Egypt and Iran (ibid 183, 185).
This concept of twine toleration and interplay between secular setup and religion is what Jamaate-Ahmadiyya idealizes. Mirza Masroor Ahmad, the incumbent caliph of the Jamaat, in an
interview in Toronto while defending Muslim Hijab and disapproving mixed-gatherings said: “The
state should not interfere with matters which are religious” (Mansbridge 2016). It is part of
Ahmadiyya religious teachings to abide by the laws and stay faithful to the country in which they
live with expectation from the state not to interfere with their religiosity.
In the discussion to follow, I begin with the West’s common understanding that Muslims,
being ‘anti-modern’, are ‘against secularism’. Then, I move toward Mr Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s
vision of a secular Pakistan. I will explain how this vision was taken in and out of Parliament as a
threat to Islam and was never let to become the state ideology. With the decline of the vision for a
secular state, religious minorities in general and the Ahmadiyya community in particular were
gradually pushed out of the democratic process; ultimately, this ended in their total exclusion from
the Islamic fold in the process of nation-building. I then provide details about the position of
Ahmadis in India and Bangladesh to show how different state setups (religious and secular) in the
region having same colonial experience and sharing borders treat this religious minority. In the
next part, I will give details of pull factors for Ahmadis in Canada and the trajectory of how their
persecution increased the level of their support for secular values. To prove the change in their
approach to secularism, I will provide details regarding their religiosity before and after their
persecution was started. In conclusion, I will present brief comparative studies of Alevis and
Ismailis to strengthen my hypothesis. I will unpack the discussion that there are different factors—
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belonging to a persecuted community being one of those—that affect Muslims’ endorsement of
secularism.

1.1

POSITIONALITY

Born and raised in a Sunni Muslim family in Pakistan, I was unaware of any of the discrimination
Ahmadis were facing until I pursued journalism as a profession. Two members of the Jamaat-eAhmadiyya visited me at my office in 2006 and tried to convince me of their persecution for media
coverage. Though unconvinced by them, I started paying attention and found them to be facing
hardships at every step of life. After a week or so, a retired Ahmad school teacher was killed for
his religion. He became my first story. Until June 2017, I wrote, as a reporter, extensively on the
persecution of Ahmadis and other religious minorities.1 Several academic studies and media
reports quoted my stories.2 Based on my work on religion in general and Ahmadis in particular, I
received various fellowships, including one from the Alliance for Historical Dialogue and
Accountability as a visiting scholar of the Institute of Religion, Culture and Public Life at

1

These are few of my significant stories on religious minorities in Pakistan i.e. Ahmadis, Christians, Hindus, Sikhs
and Jains:
https://dailytimes.com.pk/124274/salam-family-had-reservations-over-renaming-sans-concrete-measures-forreligious-freedom/
https://tribune.com.pk/story/17105/over-88-killed-in-twin-gun-and-bomb-attacks
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1401425/crosshairs-ahmadi-gunned-rahim-yar-khan-district
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1395510/illegal-detention-policeman-booked-forced-conversion
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1369066/youhanabad-lynching-christian-suspects-asked-convert-return-release
https://tribune.com.pk/story/487631/missing-businesswoman-canadian-sikh-was-killed-the-day-she-landed-inpakistan
https://tribune.com.pk/story/995808/after-factory-mob-torches-ahmadi-place-of-worship-in-jhelum-over-blasphemyallegations/
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1419381/jain-temple-doubling-playground-cops-robbers
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1302960/dead-bodies-hindus-helpless-graveyard-encroachment-despite-court-order
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1262449/intolerance-ahmadi-place-worship-stormed-chakwal/
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1255100/jamat-e-ahmadias-rabwa-office-raided-four-members-held-hate-speech/
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1249793/assembly-session-mpas-assured-ahmadis-will-not-teach-islamic-studies/
2
https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/country-information/rir/Pages/index.aspx?doc=456309
http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00litlinks/naim/txt_naim_ferozewala_2010.pdf
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Columbia University and one from the Senior Journalists Seminar of East-West Centre based at
Hawaii University to observe religious diversity in three different countries. During my stay in
Canada, from September 2017 to August 2019, I stayed close to the Ahmadiyya community, which
gave me an opportunity to observe how their religious and social life intersect with the secularity
of Canada.

1.2

METHODOLOGY AND DATA SOURCES

This paper has benefited from secondary works on Muslim immigrants in North America; religion
and politics in Pakistan, the historical trajectory of religious ideologies and persecution of the
Ahmadiyya community. In addition to various academic materials, I have made use of information
collected through personal experience with the Ahmadiyya community in Pakistan, the Greater
Toronto Area, Ottawa, and Saskatoon. This personal experience comprises meetings with
individuals and groups and participation in their religious and social events. To evaluate the shift
of the Ahmadiyya approach from a religious to a secular state, I have used Ahmadi religious
literature, including addresses and teachings of their Caliphs and Canadian leadership, and their
newspapers and periodicals published in Pakistan and Canada. News items of some Canadian
dailies are used also. To give an overview of Ahmadi exclusion and persecution in Pakistan, I have
consulted some court cases, newspapers, and annual reports prepared by Jamaat-e-Ahmadiyya. I
have monitored different social media accounts of Pakistani immigrants in Canada to develop an
idea of the discriminatory attitude of non-Ahmadi Pakistanis toward Ahmadis in Canada.
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2.

Islam and secularism: Western view of Muslim homogeneity

It is a common notion in public debate and academic literature that Muslims are fundamentalists,
anti-modern and against Western ‘norms’ hence oppose secularism. Particularly in North America
Islam is considered as a “foreign” and “un-American” religion (Casanova 2007, 62). Secular
Westerners seem welcoming each immigrant, regardless of race or religion, as long as they are
able to accept and respect the Western ‘liberal and secular values’. Philips Jenkins points toward
political rhetoric that terms coming of Muslim immigrants to Europe as Europe being Islamized.
Part of this rhetoric is that Muslims are considered against secular values as well as against their
Christian and Jewish neighbours (2009, 14). There is a common assumption among political circles
of Europe that consider Muslims in the continent as a problem for being ‘barely compatible’ with
liberal views. It is hard to consider Islam being idealized, secularized and harmonized in the “real
world”. Liberal Europeans seem to raise questions toward Muslims, “Why do you need religion?
Why can’t you live like us” (Jenkins 2002, 259)? Casanova finds today’s uniform anti-Muslim
discourse in the West, similar to that against Catholicism in nineteenth-century (2007, 65). The
perception of Muslims being fanatics, fundamentalists, and opposed to the secular values is based
on understanding them as having fixed religious values that are considered permanently
incompatible with Western values. Therefore the first question to deal with is whether all Muslims
in the West are homogeneous and possessing fixed religious ethos contrary to secularism?
The heterogeneity of Muslims, observed by Brubaker, is strengthened by Casanova. His
observation is useful to challenge the Western notion that finds Muslims having fixed religion.
Muslim immigrants in the United States are “extremely diverse” on the basis of their geographical
background, in terms of their discursive religious traditions, and in terms of their socioeconomic
8

characteristics (Casanova 2007, 4). It is justified to say that over time, Islam has come in many
shades of practice, some much more open and tolerant than others. Majority of the Muslims in the
West, in general, and in North America, in particular, consider Islam as part of their family
background. After moving to the non-Muslim West, Muslims redefine their understanding of what
it meant to be a Muslim (Jenkins 2009, 261). Bouman and Ling’s findings is also useful to mention
here. They find cultures and identities as not stable and fixed; rather they are syncretic, fluid and
mixed in a modern and globalized age. Religion moves in its constant adaptation to new societal
contexts, be this rapid social change or settlement in a different social-cultural environment
(Bouma and Ling 2009, 351). Referring to different case studies conducted in USA, Germany and
Canada, Martin finds young immigrants rarely focusing on religious customs and preservation
(2009, 341–42). These findings support the hypothesis that if Muslims’ understanding of Islam is
not fixed and they are heterogeneous, their attitude towards secular values in the West must differ
on the basis of different contextual factors in countries of their origin that proves Western view of
Muslim homogeneity as incorrect.
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3.

Desecularisation and Ahmadiyya Exclusion in Pakistan

Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908), founder of Ahmadiyya community, in 1888 had announced
to be a divine person, Mujaddid, Mohaddis, Krishna, promised messiah and, ultimately in 1901, a
subordinate prophet at his birthplace, Qadian, an area in Indian Punjab. He negated violent Jihad
and openly expressed his support to the British government in India. The same year, he named his
community as Jamaat-i-Ahmadiyya, and on his request, the British government considered his
community as a separate community from other Muslims in the census of 1901 (Munir 1954, 10;
Saeed 2010, 112). After Ahmad’s death on May 26, 1908, his caliphate started with his close aide
Hakeem Maulvi Nur-ud-Din becoming his first caliph. Din was the only caliph out of Ahmad’s
family lineage among five caliphs so far (see Appendix 1). On Din’s death in March 1914, Ghulam
Ahmad’s son Mirza Bashir-ud-Din Mahmood Ahmad became the head of the Jamaat and second
caliph. Mahmood introduced the structure of the Jamaat strictly hierarchical with the supreme
authority of the incumbent caliph. The caliph cannot be removed or deposed as his position is for
life. He has the power to excommunicate or oust members of the community for their
‘objectionable’ behaviours and over nonpayment of mandatory monthly Chanda (financial
contribution) (Saeed 2010, 124). Cantwell Smith described the Jamaat under Mahmood’s
leadership in 1943 as “combining a purifying spirit of orthodox reform, having a tinge of the new
liberalism, a mystic irrationalism, and the authoritarianism of new revelation” (1943, 324–25). It
kept itself away from Pakistan movement (see Appendix 2), did not join Muslims and Hindus in
the Khilafat Movement (1919-1924) and, unlike majority Indians, always openly supported the
British Colonizers.
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Ghulam Ahmad’s prophecies, particularly his claim to be a prophet, and Jamaat’s political
stances gave rise to the feeling of hostility and hatred toward the Jamaat. Though many of Indian
Ulema had issued join fatwas terming Ahmad and his followers as kafirs (infidels) but first
organized movement against the Jamaat was initiated in 1931 with the emergence of Majlis-eAhrar. The conflict between the Ahrar and the Jamaat took birth largely due to political differences
because both of them were carrying out ‘Kashmir cause’ from opposite camps. The Jamaat was
continuing agitation from the platform of the All India Kashmir Committee with its caliph being
chairman of the committee. Dr Allama Muhammad Iqbal, famous poet and one of the leaders of
Pakistan movement, was also a member of the committee (Munir 1954, 11). The Ahrar continued
mobilizing Muslims of India against Ahmadis and All India Muslim League and was opposing
Pakistan movement like Jamat-e-Islami. By 1935, the Ahrar succeeded in forming a mass
movement against Ahmadis, and some individuals of Jamaat-e-Islami and Muslim League also
started expressing resentment against Ahmadis. Allama Iqbal in a letter to the editor of Calcutta
daily The Statesman in June 1935 first time wrote Ahmadis as non-Muslims (Saeed 2010, 146).
Punjab chapter of the Muslim League in 1938 had banned membership of Ahmadis considering
them non-Muslims.
As partition of India came closer, initially Ahmadis decided to settle in India to stay close
to their sacred places in Qadian. Following the violence against Muslims in areas surrounding
Qadian, the Ahmadis wrote letters to Indian leaders Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, and
Sardar Patel requesting them for protection. Having no reply from any of the leaders and following
the intense rioting in Punjab, Ahmadiyya community moved to Lahore (Saeed 2010, 157–59).
Before coming to Pakistan, Ahmadis wrote letters to Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan for assurance
of protection but in vain. After coming to Pakistan uninvited, the Ahmadiyya community chose to
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set up their own city – Rabwa – at a distance of about 100 miles away from Lahore. The
community’s going away from the urban areas might be because of anti-Ahmadiyya movement
which followed it to Pakistan as well. Now Rabwa is their spiritual headquarters in the world
having their schools and health system. The Ahrar again launched an anti-Ahmadi campaign in
Pakistan in 1953 but this time with active public support of key actors of the ruling party, the
Muslim League, and major religious parties such as the Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamiat Ulema Islam
(Saeed 2010, 7).
Majority of the scholars agree that Muhammad Ali Jinnah, founder of Pakistan, proposed
the concept of a secular Pakistan. During his life, before and after the independence of Pakistan,
two parallel narratives – secular and Islamic – had been taking place in the Muslim League. In
1938 Jinnah had disbanded Punjab chapter of the Muslim League for its banning membership of
Ahmadis (Saeed 2010, 154). “Who am I to declare a person non-Muslim who calls himself a
Muslim” was the reply of Jinnah in 1944 at a question of a journalist about his view on the religious
status of Ahmadis (ibid 2010, 6). In his policy statement on August 11, 1947, Jinnah as first
Governor-General of Pakistan categorically said there would be no relationship between the state
and religion. He saw equal rights for every citizen regardless of religion. Jinnah did not just say it;
he took practical decisions accordingly. He appointed Joginder Nath Mandal, a Hindu, and
Chaudhry Zafrullah Khan, an Ahmadi, to his first cabinet. Keeping in mind that Pakistan has come
into being as a state for the Muslim minority of the subcontinent, he proposed that every religion
should have freedom of practice, but it should have no political role in affairs of the state. Based
on previous experience of communal and religious clashes between Hindus and Muslims, Jinnah
had a clear idea of a political religion that would “undermine civil society or individual liberties”
(Asad 2003, 182), therefore he envisioned separation of religion and the state. Deviation from
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Jinnah’s vision has proved disastrous for minorities. There were almost 23 percent non-Muslim
citizens in 1947 and now they are reduced to less than four percent including Ahmadis (Ispahani
2017a, 9).
The day Jinnah expressed the vision of a secular state, moves within and out of the
parliament were initiated against it. The only segments of society to defend it were religious
minorities, including Hindus and Christians. Jinnah’s speech was followed by the debate to finalize
the design of the flag of Pakistan. Non-Muslim members of the assembly “unanimously expressed
their disapproval of the flag” saying that they had not been consulted in this regard and the
proposed flag being almost identical with the party flag of the Muslim League was representing
the Muslim community. Their objections were rejected, and the flag was finalized through a
majority vote of Muslim members of the assembly (Saeed 2010, 174). Jinnah did not intervene in
the debate. We can say that the flag debate, the first-ever debate in the Constituent Assembly, and
decision on it decided a course of Muslim leaders towards religious nationalism, putting religious
minorities aside.
After the death of Jinnah, the Constituent Assembly adopted the Objectives Resolution in
1949 (see Appendix 3), which provided the basis of Islamization in Pakistan. Three out of its
eleven clauses, give explicit reference to Islam. It begins with “sovereignty over the entire universe
belongs to Allah Almighty”. Clause four says “the principles of democracy, freedom, equality,
tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam, shall be fully observed”. The resolution,
providing the aims and objects of the Constitution, became the preamble of the future constitutions
of Pakistan and proved to be a Muslim nationalist discourse. It provided the basis of Islamization
in legal codes of Pakistan. It is worth mentioning that Zafrullah Khan vehemently defended the
Objectives Resolution in and out of the parliament. Encouraged with the passage of the Objectives
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Resolution, by 1953 the clerics started demanding inclusion of Islam in law and state policy. To
spearhead their move for Islamization, they took anti-Ahmadi elements with them and ended up
initiating a mass movement against Ahmadis. By the end of February 1953, riots began. Ahmadis
were attacked, their properties were destroyed, and some lives lost (Feldman 1967, 41–42). The
army had to intervene, and the country witnessed the first martial law to quell this religious
movement. As a result of this move, the vision for a secular state had become anti-secular. A
judicial commission was formed to determine responsibility for the riots. The commission, while
recording statements of the anti-Ahmadi clerics, asked them whether Jinnah’s concept of secular
Pakistan was acceptable to them and every one replied in negative. Maulana Amin Ahsan Islahi,
representing the Jamaat-e-Islami, responded that “a state based on this idea is the creature of the
devil” (Munir 1954, 203). The state’s policy of accommodation towards Ahmadis in 1954 turned
out to be a policy of exclusion in 1974. The state gave in to the demands of the protesters and
through a constitutional amendment declared Ahmadis as non-Muslims under article 260(3a, 3b)
of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan.3 There was not a single member in the
parliament to represent the interests of minorities, especially Ahmadis.
Ten years later, in 1984, religious freedom of Ahmadis was further curtailed through a
presidential Ordinance (see Appendix 4). Section 298-B and 298-C were inserted into Pakistan
Penal Code 1860 through this ordinance. Under these sections, “misuse of epithets, descriptions
and titles, etc., reserved for certain holy personages or places” was prescribed as punishable for

3

Article 260 of the Constitution:
(3a) “Muslim” means a person who believes in the unity and oneness of Almighty Allah, in the absolute and
unqualified finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad (peace be upon him), the last of the prophets, and does not
believe in, or recognize as a prophet or religious reformer, any person who claimed or claims to be a prophet, in any
sense of the word or of any description whatsoever, after Muhammad (peace be upon him); and
(3b) “non-Muslim” means a person who is not a Muslim and includes a person belonging to the Christian, Hindu,
Sikh, Buddhist or Parsi community, a person of the Quadiani Group or the Lahori Group who call themselves
‘Ahmadis’ or by any other name or a Bahai, and a person belonging to any of the Scheduled Castes.
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Ahmadis and their right of self-identification was taken away by barring them from “posing like
Muslims”. The state policy of accommodation, which was turned into the policy of exclusion in
1974, ended up to be a policy of criminalization in 1984. During General Zia’s tenure, apart from
several anti-Ahmadi and Islamic provisions, a controversial set of blasphemy law was introduced.
The most controversial part of the blasphemy law is section 295-C of Pakistan Penal Code, which
was introduced in 1986 providing life imprisonment for derogatory remarks in respect of Prophet
Muhammad. In 1991, during the premiership of Nawaz Sharif, the punishment of life
imprisonment was replaced with capital punishment.4 As section 295-C exclusively deals with
respect of the prophet of Islam, Ahmadis and other religious minorities in Pakistan become victims
of it. This gradual process of desecularisation and rise of religious nationalism has not only
strengthened the religious sentiment in successfully dictating the religious content of state policies
but also excluded the religious minorities from political life. Now there are countless religious
organizations across the country carrying out anti-Ahmadi or anti-blasphemy agenda with special
focus on non-Muslims.
Legal steps taken by the state give a sense of legitimacy to violence against Ahmadis, who
have been continuously victimized at the hands of the state and vigilantism. According to the
annual Ahmadiyya Persecution Report 2019, in Pakistan since 1984, 262 Ahmadis have been
killed, and 388 have been assaulted. Meanwhile, 28 of their mosques have been demolished, 39
sealed by the state, 23 set on fire or partially damaged, and 17 forcibly occupied by mainstream
Muslims. Fifty-eight incidents occurred in which the government barred Ahmadis from

4

Section 295-C of Pakistan Penal Code:
Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation or by any imputation, innuendo, or
insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) shall
be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.
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constructing mosques. Additionally, the dead bodies of 39 Ahmadis have been forcibly exhumed
from common cemeteries, and 69 of their burials have been halted by anti-Ahmadi elements
(Ahmadiyya 2019, 165). All Ahmadi publications, including weeklies, periodicals, and religious
books are banned in Pakistan (Tanveer 2013). Police arrest staff and confiscates printed facilities
whenever it finds them printing Ahmadi material (ibid. 2016). They cannot perform their religious
practices openly, and neither say call for prayer nor call their place of worship as a mosque
(Ispahani 2017b, 5).
This rise of Islamisation as a state policy is a systematic “desecularisation” that shows how
distinct notion of citizenship, national identity and religious politics have become part of the state
(Saeed 2013, 62). This process of desecularisation and rise of Islamisation has led to make the
religious front as a pressure group in dictating the state policies and to the slow and gradual exit
of all religious minorities in general and Ahmadis in particular from organized political life.
Ahmadis cannot cast their vote nor contest election at any level. These steps have given way to the
politics of street-power that help the charged mobs to target religious minorities with impunity
under the pretext of blasphemy allegations. Politics of fear and exclusion of voices of dissent are
another outcomes of this historical process. Any politician, rights activist or journalists who speak
in favour of Ahmadis come under hot waters. Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif came under
severe criticism for condemning attacks on two Ahmadi mosques in Lahore in 2010, which left
more than 88 worshippers dead (Dawn 2010). Apart from bad economic conditions, scarcity of
better jobs, and better education opportunities, the above mentioned ouster of Ahmadis from the
nationalist discourse have become a major factor to push them out of the country. To understand
the historical process of desecularisation in Pakistan and the treatment of the Ahmadiyya Muslim
community, studying Bangladesh and India, which comprised one country before 1947 and share
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the borders and history of colonialism, will be helpful. Therefore before discussing Ahmadiyya
arrival in Canada, I will discuss the interplay of religion and secularism and situation of Ahmadis
in rest of these two countries of the subcontinent.
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4.

Religion, Secularism and Ahmadis in the Subcontinent

Supporters of secularism say that a state having secular democratic values has an advantage over
one which is based on the religious notion. They consider secularism to have nothing to do with
ideological clashes which theological opinions have. It is considered objective, neutral and much
more palpable to diverse people living together at one place. How the legal codes of a state should
deal with society having highly religious people, they ask. The critics of secularism say it has
nothing to do with ethics. It takes ethics from religion but does not acknowledge. The study of
some of the countries of the subcontinent seems an excellent location to understand how religious
minorities are being treated under theocracy and secularism. The aim here is not to prove
secularism better than the religion or vice versa but to present a true picture by comparing countries
with similar historical and socio-economic contexts that have adopted one option or the other. A
comprehensive study of Pakistan can be significant in understanding the state of affairs, but
comparing it with India and Bangladesh would provide a more robust and proper understanding
with a focus on violation or provision of minority rights particularly those of Ahmadis. As Pakistan
and Bangladesh (East Pakistan from 1947 to 1971) were separated from India for the religious
freedom of the Muslim minority, a study of minorities’ rights in these all three countries shows
that new border lines created new minority and majority groups with religious clashes staying
there, with some variations.

4.1

INDIA

India has a secular identity and an outstanding record as a functioning liberal democracy in South
Asia, if not in the Third World. At least in its legal codes and as part of its state policy, it has put
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several steps in place for protection of the minorities. Various articles of its constitution guarantee
different freedoms. Apart from the state assistance to minority institutions, under article 30, they
are given right to establish and administer their educational institutions while article 26 deals with
the freedom to manage religious affairs. Secular image of its constitution also reflects in other legal
and policy codes of the state. There are various institutions like National Commission for
Minorities, Ministry of Minority Affairs, Ministry of Tribal Affairs, National Minorities
Development and Finance Corporation, and National Commission for Scheduled Tribes to
empower and to protect the minorities. Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir (at least in documents),
animist and Christians in the northeast are provided autonomy (Manchanda 2009).
India has witnessed severe communal clashes, including a series of riots in almost all over
India after 1992-demolition of historic Babri Mosque in Ayodhya. Most of the riots were among
Muslims and Hindus, which took thousands of lives. In its northeast areas, minorities lack
protection. Rise of Narendra Modi as Prime Minister since 2014 has become synonymous with the
rise of Hindu nationalism in India which put a serious question mark over the protection of
minorities, especially Muslims, and India’s claim to be a secular state. Legislations in different
states to ban cow slaughter, revocation of the autonomous status of Jammu and Kashmir in 2019,
and approval to build Ram Mandir, where Babri Mosque once was, are a few among many steps
to polarize the India society and to undermine its identity of a secular state. The incidents like
demolition of Babri mosque by Hindu hardliners and the subsequent decision of the High Court in
their favour demonstrated that state and judiciary, when necessary, find it justified to give priority
to the majority religion in taking decisions over their commitment to the secular legal codes and
promises made under this umbrella (Mufti 2007).
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Ahmadis are recognized as Muslims by the state of India, but they face threats and violence
from different Muslim groups. They face calls for social boycott, physical attacks, and threats to
limit their religious activities. Jamaat-e-Islami, Majlis Tahaffuz-e-Khatam-e-Nabuwwat, and
Majlis-e-Ahrar are major Muslim organizations carrying out a campaign to declare Ahmadis as
non-Muslims in India. However, Ahmadis express a sense of satisfaction toward Indian authorities.
“[I]n order to avoid conflict with Indian authorities”, the community tend to downplay acts of
violence against it (Immigration and Refugee Board Canada 2015). When there are anti-Muslim
riots in India, Ahmadis are lumped together with other Muslims. Due to countrywide protests over
anti-Muslim Citizenship Amendment Act, Jamaat-e-Ahmadiyya postponed its annual convention
scheduled for December 27 to 29, 2019. As India is the birthplace of the founder of Jamaat-eAhmadiyya and the origin of their movement, annual convention India has status of a pilgrimage
for Ahmadis.
Despite all these anti minority circumstances, it is not justified to term India as a religious
state. Its vibrant civil society is what differentiates it from Pakistan and Bangladesh. Last year’s
countrywide protests participated by every segment of society against Citizenship Amendment Act
are an indication of a spirit instilled among the citizens by the secular identity of the state. No
doubt India’s strong and continuous democracy is also a fruit of secularism unlike in Pakistan and
Bangladesh. Mahendra Lowati is rightful to say that Hindu nationalists would become more
encouraged and violent to repress minorities in India if Hinduism is given the status of a state
religion in India like Islam in Bangladesh and Pakistan (2017, 274). Secular identity of the state
provides a sense of belonging to its minorities which would have been taken away by giving
Hinduism status of the state religion in India. The Ahmadiyya issue has its roots in India since the
late nineteenth century, but India did not take any serious discriminatory steps against them despite
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repeated demands from some significant groups of its more than 172 million Muslim citizens.
However, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan excluded them in less than three decades by providing
a sense of superiority to its majority Muslims who are now in a position to dictating the state. No
doubt, it is the secular status of India that makes Ahmadis have a sense of satisfaction towards
state institutions.

4.2

BANGLADESH

Bangladesh, being a Muslim majority country, has Islam as its state religion. It was formerly known as East
Pakistan until separation in 1971. After its independence, first Constitution of 1972 adopted the secular
status of the state in lines with Jinnah’s vision. However, the first constitutional amendment of 1979
revoked the secular status, and in 1988 Islam was declared as the state religion. High Court and Supreme
Court of Bangladesh declared the removal of secularism from the Constitution as illegal, respectively in
2005 and 2011, but the status of the state remained Islamic (Bhuiyan 2017, 1). These constitutional steps
toward the rise of Islam in Bangladesh, set the tone of the majority Muslims. These steps provided ground
for reemergence to Islamic political parties including Islamic Okye Jyote and Jamaat-e-Islami. Religious
minorities, including Hindus, Buddhists, Christians, which are 11 percent of the total population, and sect
within Islami like Ahmadis, start facing discrimination at state and social levels. More than one million
cases of the land grabbing from Hindus are pending adjudication. Incidents of discrimination against
minorities are increased since the state became Islamic. Millions of Hindus and Buddhists have emigrated
to India for life (Lawoti 2017, 272).
Ahmadis, who are 0.1 percent of the population in Bangladesh, have been facing hate campaign
and movements to declare them as non-Muslims in lines with Pakistan. Anti-Ahmadi movement in
Bangladesh started in 1977 with an attack on their annual convention in Barahmanbaria, a district of
Chittagong division, by anti-Ahmadiyya extremists. A fresh spate of attacks and threats took rise against
Ahmadis in the 1990s. At least 12 Ahmadis were injured in 1992 when a procession of more than 1000
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charged affiliates of Khatam-e-Nabuwwat attacked Ahmadiyya complex in Dhaka. Rooms were ransacked,
valuables were damaged, and books and other literature were set on fire. Some of their mosques have been
demolished or grabbed, and they continuously face calls for social boycotts. Conferences, public meetings
and processions organized by the Khatam-e-Nabuwwat and often participated by speakers from Pakistan
and India have a significant contribution to spreading hate against Ahmadis (Watch 2005).

The discussion shows that the state’s religious status becomes a tool for discrimination
within the hands of the majority. In contrast, countries with secular identity try to protect minority
rights or at least minimize violence. Though Ahmadis of India left for Pakistan in 1947 because of
a lack of protection, it is the secular setup in India that gave them a sense of security and
satisfaction over the time, unlike Pakistan. A lot of Sikhs emigrated from India after operation
Blue Star in 1984, but at the state level, they were not facing any exclusion. In India, communal
riots have been occurring ever since their independence and have taken thousands of lives. The
representation of high-caste Hinduism mediates the nation’s public image, and those who do not
fit into that high-caste position are considered religious minorities (Chatterjee 1992). No doubt
these characteristics undermine the claim of secularism in India but do not remove it altogether. A
secular state does not and cannot guarantee peace and toleration; it puts into play some legal
frameworks to regulate violence with an ambition to eliminate it (Asad 2003, 8). Several
institutions in India that protect minorities keep the state from following the exclusion course like
Pakistan. Giving religious status to a state hampers equality and undermines tolerance towards
religious minorities. State institutions based on secular ideas are more likely to strengthen
democratic institutions like those found in India. Contrarily, Pakistan presents a bleak picture of
its democracy with multiple coups and military influence, even during democratic setups. In
Pakistan and Bangladesh, religious orientations are to blame for the shrinking democratic space
for minorities. Prioritizing any one religion means undermining others. It provides an underlying
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justification for making biases against minorities a part of legal and state policies, whereas this is
not likely the case with a secular state.
Going through studies of Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh, one could say that the postenlightenment era often encounters a precarious block of minorities. The situation in these
dominions draws attention towards the challenges posed to the minority question under the agenda
of modernity and globalization, which Amir Mufti calls “treacherous and heavily policed oceans
that separate the narratives and figures of modernity in Europe from their reappearances in the
colonies” (Mufti 2007, 10). I do not mean to find reasons why secular narratives in the subcontinent, the former British colony, are missing, unlike in the West, but to draw attention toward
the similarities in how these former colonies ruled by one colonizer are dealing with minorities.
One thing is clear – although the situation of Ahmadis is more favourable in India than in
Bangladesh and Pakistan, the factors attracting them towards the West are missing in India too.
The protection and the sense of belonging that Ahmadis feel in the secular setup of Canada and
the factors allowing them to establish a distinctive identity and religious freedom form the central
themes of the next part of the paper.
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5.

Ahmadis arrive in Canada and make it home

Ahmadi missionaries have been coming to Canada since 1966; however, when Pakistan declared
them non-Muslims in 1974, they started migrating to Canada. After the 1984 ban on their religious
practices, a massive wave of Ahmadi emigrants began moving to western countries. Attracted by
Canada’s religious and cultural diversity, a large number of Ahmadis, fleeing persecution, have
made it home. Their religious body was registered as Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at Canada Inc. in
Canada with the arrival of its first missionary in 1966. The community purchased a 25-acre piece
of land in 1985 at Vaughan, GTA, where they built a mosque and the Canada mission house. Now
they have built their locality comprising 260 homes at a 50 acre piece of land adjacent to the
mosque. Its nine streets are named after Ahmadi religious leaders and notables (Malik 2013).
There are about 30,000 Ahmadis in Canada, and they have a very closely-knit and
organized setup, like in other more than 200 countries of the world. They have one administrative
head in Canada who is called Ameer. Under his leadership, there are 11 regional and local Ameers
supervising 116 chapters functioning across Canada. Other than several mosques operating in
existed structure, it has constructed eight prominent mosques in different cities. The biggest
mosque in North America is Baitul Islam, an Ahmadi mosque in Maple, Ontario, which was
inaugurated in 1992 (Gualtieri 2004, 7). Other major Ahmadi mosques are in Brampton,
Scarborough, Calgary, Vancouver, Lloydminster, Regina and Saskatoon. Ahmadis are educated,
using modern technologies and in good books of mainstream political parties. Local and national
politicians willingly participate in their religious activities, which continue throughout the year.
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and many members of the parliament participated in their annual
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convention on July 09, 2019, and virtual Iftar (Muslim fast-breaking) organized by Ahmadis on
April 23, 2020. Majority of the Ahmadis in Canada have a sense of satisfaction and support toward
the system yet keep on trying to seek special attention by distancing themselves from fanatic,
terrorist, and radical assumptions associated with Islam. Michael Nijhawan explains different
aspects of Ahmadi identity in Canada as saying that they consider their community different from
other Muslim groups, a model minority deserving special attention for being, what they say, fully
integrated into the Canadian society. They appreciate Canada for being “welcoming society for
ethnic and religious diversity” where they can perform their religious practices freely and can build
their religious institutions (Nijhawan 2016, 237).
The state of Canada through different steps make them realize that they are accommodated.
In 1990, the Ontario government built a 14-story building in Toronto for Ahmadiyya refugees. The
building, comprising 166 apartments and a prayer hall of 2500 square feet, was handed over to
Ahmadis for their exclusive use. The government has been facing criticism for this exclusive
project for any ethnic community as no non-Ahmadi can live there (“Muslims Only” 2015). The
secular judicial system of Canada accommodates Ahmadi refugees in deciding their refugee
claims. The quasi-judicial tribunals of the Immigration and Refugee Board functions in
consultation with the Jamaat’s administration to deal with cases of Ahmadi refugees (Soennecken
2009, 2). The IRB officials are well aware of the situation of Ahmadis in Pakistan as some of them
have visited Pakistan to have a better understanding of their persecution. Before going to the
question of violence, the IRB members ask the claimant to prove his religious identity. The IRB
verifies the religious identity of any Ahmadi refugee claimant from Jamaat-i-Ahmadiyya, which
issues certificates of authenticity in this regard (Nijhawan 2016, 114). In this course of the
assessment of religious identity, justifiably, it can be said that Jamaat-i-Ahmadiyya has proved
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itself as an integral component of the secular system. Along with its efforts to build its image of a
community able to assimilate into Canadian culture, the Jamaat has successfully recognized itself
as a persecuted and peaceful community in comparison with its opponent Muslim groups hailing
from its perpetrating society.
While trying to differentiate themselves from other Muslims and trying to establish their
separate identity as Ahmadi Muslims and racialized subjects, they face a sense of heretic otherness
that pervades Muslim diasporic politics. Allegations of being close to the Ahmadiyya community
are enough for any Pakistani immigrant politician to lose Muslim vote. Hifza Musa, a PakistaniCanadian, lost elections for the nomination of Liberal Party MPP for Mississauga Erin Mills riding
on March 17, 2018. Her rival candidate, Imran Mian, also hailing from Pakistan, through social
media and corner meetings propagated against her of being a supporter of Ahmadis. Resultantly
Mian won, and Musa lost with a margin on 736 votes. Nijhawan points out discrimination against
Ahmadi students at the hands of Muslim students at York University. They are not allowed to
attend the function of Muslim students’ organization, and anti-Ahmadiyya leaflets are circulated
at the campus. Posters that advertised political events organized by Ahmadiyya students
disappeared mysteriously only a day after they were put up on the campus (ibid, 238). Members of
the Jamaat also face hate campaigns through social media (see Appendix 5). Ahmadis usually
ignore such hate campaigns or respond logically. They avoid clash while some individuals prefer
not disclosing their religious affiliation fearing social alienation or loss of a job. They find Taqiyya
as Islamic justification for not disclosing their real belief. Taqiyya is a practice performed by
“minority or otherwise disadvantaged groups of Muslims who fear negative repercussions should
their real faith become known” (Virani 2011, 99).

26

Canada has a special status for accommodating Ahmadi refugees. After attacks on two
Ahmadi mosques in Lahore on May 28, 2010, which left more than 80 worshippers dead, former
immigration minister Jason Kenney offered and accepted families of all victims as refugees in
Canada. There are various statements of Ahmadi caliphs in appreciation of Canada and its
inclusive values. In June 1987, their fourth caliph termed Canada as his home. Impressed by its
being welcoming, he said: “It is my prayer that Canada becomes the world and the world becomes
Canada”. He advised his followers to keep up Canadian values and defend them for these are very
precious (Tahir Ahmad 1986). Other than freedom of religion, better employment opportunities,
options for a good education, and cultural liberties can be significant pull factors.
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6.

Ahmadiyya religiosity and their move toward secularism

No doubt, the Jamaat-e-Ahmadiyya is peaceful, law-abiding, non-violent, anti-Jihad, cooperative
to the state, and moderate but looking at its past shows some contrasts. In its initial days, it had
been changing its stances as per requirements. During its initial few decades, it had realised the
necessity to build an image of a liberal movement. Cantwell Smith’s observation is very useful.
He said, “its propaganda in Europe and America omits much of the backwardness which is evident
at home and includes a large share of liberal ideology” (Smith 1943, 326). Jamaat’s literature of
pre-1970s, when they were still constitutional Muslims in Pakistan, showed their tendency toward
fanaticism. Their second caliph Mirza Bashirudin Ahmad Mahmood in April 1944, in an address
to his followers said: “with the grace of God, there would be a day when countries of the world
would be under our control” (Ahmed 1944, 285). Urging his followers for the aggressive stance,
he said, “Blood of the Muslims who died fighting in Spain is demanding us for revenge. Only true
Muslims will go and raise the Islamic flag there” (Ahmed 1944, 268). It was the time when he
started raising voice for all Muslims of the subcontinent (Saeed 2010, 154), unlike his previous
stance when he was siding with the British colonizers.
Jamaat’s tendency of theocracy became more evident after the independence of Pakistan
when it started campaigning to make Pakistan as an Islamic state. They had been highlighting news
stories and opinion pieces in their weeklies and dailies to establish a public opinion in favour of
an Islamic system. The headline of the lead story of Jamaat’s daily Al-Fazal February 15, 1948,
said: “Democracy in Pakistan would be based on pure Islamic principles” (see Appendix 6). The
lead story of Al-Fazal January 10, 1948, said: “Politics in West Punjab would be based on Sharia”
(see Appendix 7). Such propaganda newspapers carry out “for political, economic, or social
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policies” (Riegel 1935, 204). Ahmadi newspapers were carrying out propaganda by giving
relatively more space and prominence to typical stories they liked. They were applying editorial
discrimination by including analysis in the news stories in a bid to influence the policymaking. It
does not mean that a newspaper cannot prioritise some information over the other. However,
giving a particular angle and space to one kind of stories, one after the other, and making the
analysis part of the story shows that the media outlet is striving to bring into existence a state of
society which it believes to be most advantageous to the people it serves.
When the British government gave Kashmir, a Muslim majority area, to a Hindu ruler in
1946, Muslims ended up facing severe discriminations. Most of their worship places were gone
under the state control, they had no right to preach, cow slaughter was banned, and their
representation in government services was next to nothing. These factors, among others, gave birth
to Muslim agitation (Jalal 2000, 353–55). Jamaat-e-Ahmadiyya aggressively participated in that
agitation. Ahmadiyya caliph became chairman of Kashmir Muslim Conference, a Muslim platform
to struggle for Kashmir, on the recommendation of Allama Muhammad Iqbal. To support the
Kashmir cause, Ahmadis not only spent money but also sent their lawyers as volunteers to help
Muslim inmates. In 1948, when Kashmir conflict remerged, Ahmadis took a drastic step in the
negation of their basic ideology against violent Jihad. The Jamaat’s caliph established a militia –
Furqan Battalion – and gave it at the disposal of Pakistan Army to fight for Kashmir (Khan 2015,
115–16). Apart from showing loyalties to Pakistan and Islam, there is another reason behind
Ahmadis being interested in Kashmir. It is a place of reverence for them because their founder
claimed that Jesus was buried there, and it is part of their ideology that the founder of the Jamaat
was the second coming of Jesus. Since the beginning, Kashmir has been a central place in the subcontinent for Ahmadi missionary activities (Lavan 1973, 146). Hakeem Nur-ud-Din, a close aide
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of the founder of the Jamaat and his first caliph, had served as chief royal hakeem
(physician/herbalist) to two predecessors of the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, Hari Singh, for
fifteen years (Khan 2015, 97).
It is justified to say that Ahmadis, among other Islamists, played their role in providing
Islamic basis for future constitutions of the newly liberated dominion by supporting the Objectives
Resolution. Their approach towards blasphemy was not different than that of the other Muslims of
Pakistan. Sir Zafrullah Khan, the first foreign Minister of Pakistan and a devout Ahmadi, expressed
his protest against a statement of UN Assistant Secretary-General Benjamin Cohen in October
1950 considering it blasphemous and outrageous. Cohen apologised (see Appendix 8).
Their exclusion from the folds of Islam in 1974 and the declaration of their religious services of
being criminal in 1984 brought a significant shift into their approach. They started raising voice
for human rights and democracy. After 1984 ban on the public performance of their religious
practices, Ahmadiyya Gazette Canada in its June 1984 issue published the relevant part of Jinnah’s
August 11 speech and termed the ban contradictory to it (see Appendix 9). The editorial board of
the Gazette termed the ban as “suicidal course” for Pakistan and “a blot on the true Islamic
teachings of tolerance and humanity”. During the initial months of the ban, Ahmadis seemed
accepting Jinnah’s vision for a secular state halfheartedly. They were terming the ban as a negation
of Jinnah’s vision as well as against teachings of Islam. They still were thinking of Pakistan to be
an Islamic state for which they had already struggled. Paragraph on page 3 of the Gazette is suitable
to quote here.

“Any state which claims to be a[n] ‘Islamic’ has additional
obligation to guarantee the fundamental rights provided under the
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injunctions of the Holy Qur’an and teachings and example of the
Holy Prophet Muhammad. In the 37 years of Pakistan’s history, all
of her constitutions have contained statements intended to protect
and safeguard “freedom to profess religion and to manage religious
institutions.”

With the intensity of discrimination, persecution and target killings of Ahmadis, their
ideology of having an Islamic state system faded away, and they started taking refuge under secular
systems. After 1985, there is not an instance of their demand for an Islamic state. They started
adopting West’s definition of human rights and raised the slogan of “Humanity Zindabad” (long
live humanity) on June 8, 1989, in Canada. On October 9, 1980, their third caliph announced
Jamaat’s slogan as “Love for All, Hatred for None” in Spain while inaugurating a mosque (Farhat
2013). This was the Spain against which Jamaat’s second caliph had been calling for Jihad in 1944.
In 1995, they set up their non-governmental organization Humanity First with headquarter in
Vaughan, GTA. It is functioning successfully in more than 50 countries. They claim to have the
greatest food bank in Canada for the needy under this charity. Though 99 percent of its staff are
Ahmadis, they say it has nothing to do with the Jamaat.
With coming closer to the secular values, they distanced themselves from fanatic views
associated with some Muslim groups. Their views toward blasphemy were altogether changed by
1989 from those expressed by Sir Zafrullah Khan in 1950. In 1989 almost all over the Muslim
world there were bad feelings against Salman Rushdie for his Satanic Verses after Khomeini’s
killing fatwa. At a public forum, Jamaat-e-Ahmadiyya Canada leader Nasim Mehdi on behalf of
the Jamaat openly expressed disagreement with demands for Rushdie’s killing (see Appendix 10).
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It is clear to suggest that with the increase of the level of persecution in the country of
origin and sense of acceptance, belonging and protection under the secular setups in the West,
brought gradual increase on their support for secularism. Though after 1984’s ban on their public
religious practices, Ahmadis started making demands for a Pakistan in accordance with Jinnah’s
vision but in 1996 their caliph not only supported Jinnah’s vision for Pakistan but also termed
secularism as the best system for the world (M. T. Ahmad 1996). In his book “Relationship
between Religion and Politics in Islam” published in 1991, the caliph termed secular system
suitable for the world. Moreover, he said Sharia would be discriminatory to the non-Muslim
citizens in Pakistan as well as in the rest of the world (T. Ahmad 2018, 21–23).
Alfred Stepan defines this concept of secularism as “twin toleration”, where democratic
institutions, as well as different religions, have sufficient place to exercise their freedom without
interference in each other’s domain. In such a pattern, religious institutions neither have the
constitutional prerogative to influence the functioning of democratically elected representatives,
nor it can deny freedoms to any citizens (Stepan 2011, 114–16).
As already mentioned, I have focused on the separation of state and religion, freedom to
practice religion and non-interference of the state with religion, which is a portion of the broader
concept of secularism appealing to the Ahmadiyya community. Jamaat-e-Ahmadiyya leader’s
saying about Canada that “being a multi-ethnic community it has to be tolerant” and “the
government should not interfere with the matters which are religious” is exactly in line with
Stepan’s concept of twin toleration. Not only Ahmadis but also all other religious minorities get
their legal demands fulfilled under Canada’s policy of toleration. Selby, Barras and Beaman term
this situation, particularly for Muslims, as “accommodation on demand” in Canada having the
latent empowered position of Christian norms (2018, 123–24). Presence of this underlying
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empowered position of Christian norms is given importance in the public sphere which can be
measured through different indicators, one of which is different mandating paid public holidays
on Christmas and Good Friday for the majority religion, unlike the minority religions. Another
contradiction to Canadian equality, being practised toward non-religious citizens, is in its Criminal
Code 1985. Section 319(1) of the Code criminalizes hate speech, but its sub-section 3(b) gives an
exception to hate speech “based on a belief in a religious text”. So, on the basis of religious text,
any religious person has the right to carry out hate speech, unlike an irreligious person. These
potential differences can demand attention in future to be aligned with Canadian equality and
diversity.
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7.

Conclusion

Religious freedom, a crowning achievement of secularism and guaranteeing peaceful coexistence
of religiously diverse population (Mahmood 2012), attracts the persecuted communities by
guarantying them protection as well as the freedom to practice religion. The secularism
disapproves preference of one religious group over the others as well as discourages intolerance.
Persecuted under religious ideologies, Ahmadis over the time distanced themselves from hardline
ideas of religion and strengthened their identity as a democratic and inclusive community in
Canada. They are in good books of the state system and are accommodated accordingly. Just as
they are persecuted in countries of their origin, they face discrimination and hate in Canada too,
but here they do not accuse the state system of having any role in it. This factor of discrimination
helps them in defining their course of political, social and religious life. In trying not to follow the
perpetrators’ suit, Ahmadis try to exhibit secular values to prove themselves more Canadian than
the other Muslims. They usually prefer not to mix with their non-Ahmadi countrymen. They do
not vote for a political candidate who has the support of the other Muslims. There is no possibility
of Ahmadis to vote for a Muslim candidate either. Therefore they do not support any single
political party; they choose suitable candidates instead. Priority for a suitable candidate is to be
favourable for Ahmadis; otherwise, they prefer a non-religious candidate. In Brampton mayoral
elections of 2018, Ahmadis did not support Patrick Brown, the incumbent mayor, for him being
close to Pakistani immigrants. They supported Liberal Party candidate Linda Jeffery for two
reasons. First, she was not much favourite to Pakistani diaspora and second, she had promised
Ahmadis to try to get the parking space for their newly constructed mosque – Masjid Mubarik –
in Brampton. Local hate campaigns are also a factor which urge them to establish their separate
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identity as liberal Muslims by distancing themselves from Muslims facing stereotypes like violent,
conservative, anti-democracy and bearers of fixed religious ideas.
As a consequence of Ahmadis belonging to a persecuted minority, it is justified to say that
endorsement for secular institutions among persecuted communities is more than other Muslims.
To strengthen this finding, the situation of two other Muslim persecuted communities – Ismailis
and Alevis – is worth mentioning. After decades of persecution, Ismailis and Alevis have distanced
themselves from religious setups and strengthened their identity as democratic communities not
only in the host countries but also in countries of their origin. Particularly Ismailis, like Ahmadis,
have influenced certain lobbying groups in the West with their portrayal of liberal interpretation
of Islam. In Canada, they are in good books of the state system.

7.1 ISMAILIS
The Nazari Ismaili community commonly referred to as the Ismailis, has a long history of facing
oppression, genocide, and persecution at the hands of Muslim dynasties and rulers either they were
Ottoman, Safavid, Ummayyad, Abbasid, Ayyubid, Seljuq, Mongol or Timurid. After a long history
of persecution, in large number, they move to the West and live in security and enjoy full religious
freedom (Gnosis 2015). First Ismaili arrived in Canada in 1952 from Pakistan. Like to Ahmadis,
Canada has a special status for Ismailis too. In the 1970s when Uganda’s Muslim president Idi
Amin expelled Ismailis, Canada’s then-Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau promised Agha Khan that
they would accept 5000 Ismailis. Canada has the largest Ismaili settlement in the West, with its
population between 70,000 and 80,000. Agha Khan has also set up a museum in Toronto dedicated
to Muslim culture and art. He has opened the Global Center for Pluralism in Ottawa (Dewji 2018,
81–84). Khan’s views about Canada being accommodating are similar to those of the Ahmadi
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caliph. He advised his followers to consider Canada as their home. Impressed by its
accommodation of different persecuted communities, Agha Khan referred to Canada as a model
for the world (Dewji 2018, 93). Ahmadis and Ismailis equally consider the secular setup of Canada
important to them and their leaderships keep on stressing on assimilation.

7.2 ALEVIS
Resentment against Alevis, continuing since the early 20th century, was resumed after the death
of Kamal Ataturk in the late 1970s when the state of Turkey accused some of the community’s
youngsters of carrying out anti-state activities. Apart from persecution, the state was not even
ready to give them the identity of a minority (Grigoriadis 2006). In the last three decades, which
can be termed as the rise of religiosity in secular Turkey of Ataturk, Alevis in search of identity
became urban and secular (Shankland 2003). This helped them get a democratic identity both in
their country of origin and in countries where they had immigrated. Sehriban Sahin, in her
dissertation, says that massacres like the Corum pogrom of 1980, which left more than 50 Alevis
dead, instilled intense cultural and religious consciousness in Alevis, and they started demanding
religious neutrality of the state institutions (Sahin 2001). Unlike other Islamic sects, Alevis, who
self-identify as non-traditional Sunni Muslims, are excluded from the financial support of the state
(Stepan 2011, 120). Having Ataturk as their ideal, they identify themselves as secular and modern
(Shankland 2003, 5). Various studies suggest that Alevis are now distinguished from other
Muslims, not only in Turkey but also in Europe, because of their open acceptance of democratic
values. Casanova says that the contentious debates in Europe over the potential integration of
Muslim Turkey into the European Union are overshadowed by the debates on the alleged failure
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to integrate second- and third-generation Muslim immigrants into European culture (Casanova
2007, 63). Of course, this notion of non-integration does not apply to Alevis.
Apart from being welcoming to secular values, there are some other similarities between
Ahmadis and Alevis which have developed after their spending many decades under oppression.
Like Ahmadis in Pakistan, Alevis in Turkey are reluctant to talk about their religion (Shankland
2003, 3). Both groups wish to avoid theological debate that could turn into a religious clash. They
do not share details of their religion or persecution, or some of them do not disclose their religious
identity until they believe that the researcher or journalist is not against them. Another similarity
between the two communities is that they make themselves look different from other Muslims.
They give particular shapes to their beards to look like their fellows and to distinguish them from
other Muslims. Generally, Kizilbash to describe Alevis and Qadiani to refer to Ahmadis are
pejoratives, but they both use these terms with a sense of pride and reaction. These self-labels seem
to defy the public perception and to be an assertion of their identity. The current rise of Islamism
in Turkey, like conversion of Hagia Sophia museum into the mosque, construction of a big mosque
in historic Taqsim square, and increase in the number of Imam Hatip Schools, might add into the
miseries of Alevis and other religious minorities in Turkey and undermine its claim of being
secular.
These communities conceive secularism as a state instrument contrasting state repression
in the name of the majority’s religion. Particularly in the case of Ahmadis and Ismailis, with the
increase of the level of persecution and exclusion in the country of origin, secular Canada provided
them with a sense of acceptance, belonging and protection. The growing level of persecution and
an increase in their sense of protection brought a gradual increase in their support for secularism.
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Their belonging to religious persecuted communities significantly affects their supports to
religious neutrality.
With these findings, considering all Muslims as fundamentalists, antimodern, and
incompatible with secularism seems misleading. In studying Muslims’ attitudes towards the
democratic values of the West, they must not be considered a homogeneous group. Religiosity is
a multifaceted phenomenon. When studying Muslims’ approaches toward secular values, factor of
persecution must be kept in view. The study of the Ahmadiyya community in Pakistan and Canada
and comparative studies of Alevis and Ismailis, supported by academic scholarship, confirm my
hypothesis that certain Muslim immigrant groups, based on their belonging to persecuted
communities in the countries of their origin, support secular values in their countries of origin and
their host countries. Alongside these findings, several other questions have relevance about
Muslim persecuted communities in the context of their endorsement of secular values and they
remain unanswered: Do level and duration of persecution and ethnic background of these
communities also affect their level of endorsement of secular values? Is being peaceful a condition
for these heterodox communities’ endorsement of secularism? Does the level of accommodation
also affect the level of the endorsement? Does their endorsement of secular values as community
affect their individual religiosity? What does it mean to be an orthodox Muslim investigating the
approaches of heterodox Muslim communities toward secular values?
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8.

Appendices

Appendix 1
Family tree of Ghulam Ahmad to show four out of five caliphs from his family (Khan 2015, 183).
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Appendix 2
Two clippings of Ahmadiyya daily Al-Fazal. It carries statement of second Ahmadiyya caliph
dated April 10, 1944. The text highlighted with red pen, he says Pakistan cannot come into
existence. Ahmadis do not need to endorse or negate the idea of formation of Pakistan, he adds.
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APPENDIX 3
The Objectives Resolution was unanimously passed by Pakistan’s first Constituent Assembly on
12 March, 1949. It was inserted into the Pakistan’s Constitution of 1973 by a Presidential Order
in 1985. The text of the Objectives Resolution is reproduced below.
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APPENDIX 4
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APPENDIX 5
Screen shot of an anti-Ahmadi discussion taking
place at a WhatsApp group in June 2019 having
more than 170 members from Pakistani diaspora at
GTA. Some Ahmadis are also members of this
group. It says, “I witness that Mirza Ghulam
Ahmed Qadiani is a liar and infidel. His follower
are also infidels and non-Muslims.”

APPENDIX 6
Front page of Ahmadiyya daily Al-Fazal February 15, 1948
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APPENDIX 7
Front page of Ahmadiyya daily Al-Fazal January 10, 1948
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APPENDIX 8
Picture of daily The Civil & Military Gazette, Lahore, October 20, 1950. Published in Jamaat-eAhmadiyya’s Majallah Majlis-e-Ansarullah, Canada, Jan-June 2006.
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APPENDIX 9
Front page of monthly Ahmadiyya Gazette Canada, June 1984
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APPENDIX 10
News clipping of Calgary Herald, March 09, 1989.

48

9.

Bibliography

Ahmad, Mirza Tahir. 1996. “Fourth Ahmadi Leader on Jinnah’s Pakistan, Secularism and Islam
- YouTube.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yWBd4M7aGn4.
Ahmad, Tahir. 2018. The Relationship between Religion & Politics in Islam.
Ahmadiyya, Jamaat. 2019. “A Report on Persecution of Ahmadis in Pakistan During the Year
2018.” Lahore. https://www.persecutionofahmadis.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/02/Persecution-of-Ahmadis-in-Pakistan-2018.pdf.
Ahmed, Bashrirudin Mahmud. 1944. “Friday Sermon April 14th, 1944.” 1944.
https://www.alislam.org/friday-sermon/1944-04-14.html.
Asad, Talal. 2003. Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity. Cultural Memory
in the Present. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press.
Bhuiyan, Jahid Hossain. 2017. “Secularism in the Constitution of Bangladesh.” The Journal of
Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 49 (2): 204–27.
https://doi.org/10.1080/07329113.2017.1341479.
Bouma, Gary, and Rod Ling. 2009. “Religious Diversity.” In The Oxford Handbook of the
Sociology of Religion. The Oxford Handbooks Series. Oxford ; Oxford University Press.
Brubaker, Rogers. 2013. “Categories of Analysis and Categories of Practice: A Note on the
Study of Muslims in European Countries of Immigration.” Ethnic & Racial Studies 36
(1): 1–8. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2012.729674.
Casanova, Jose. 2007. “Immigration and the New Religious Pluralism.” In Democracy and the
New Religious Pluralism., edited by Thomas Banchoff, 59–84. New York: Oxford
University Press USA - OSO.
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195307221.001.0001.
Chatterjee, PARTHA. 1992. “History and the Nationalization Of Hinduism.” Social Research 59
(1): 111–49.
Dawn. 2010. “PML-N Defends Nawaz`s Remarks about Ahmadis.” DAWN.COM. June 10,
2010. http://www.dawn.com/news/850096.
Dawson, Lorne L., and Paul Bramadat. 2014. Religious Radicalization and Securitization in
Canada and Beyond. Toronto [Ontario: University of Toronto Press.
Dewji, Sahir. 2018a. “The Aga Khan’s Discourse of Applied Pluralism: Converging the
‘Religious’ and the ‘Secular.’” Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 47 (1): 78–106.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0008429817713738.
Farhat, Amtul Q. 2013. “A History and Description of the Ahmadiyya Motto: Love for All,
Hatred for None.” The Muslim Times (blog). June 8, 2013.
https://themuslimtimes.info/2013/06/08/a-history-and-description-of-the-ahmadiyyamotto-love-for-all-hatred-for-none/.
Feldman, Herbert. 1967. Revolution in Pakistan: A Study of the Martial Law Administration.
Oxford U.P.
Gnosis, Ismaili. 2015. “Ismailis through History: From Persecuted Minority to Pluralist
Community.” Ismaili Gnosis (blog). May 21, 2015.

49

https://ismailignosis.com/2015/05/21/ismailis-through-history-from-persecuted-minorityto-pluralist-community/.
Grigoriadis, Ioannis N. 2006. “Political Participation of Turkey’s Kurds and Alevis: A Challenge
for Turkey’s Democratic Consolidation.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 6
(4): 445–61. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683850601016291.
Gualtieri, Antonio. 2004. The Ahmadis: Community, Gender, and Politics in a Muslim Society. 1
edition. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Immigration and Refugee Board Canada. 2015. “India: Treatment of Ahmadis [Ahmadiyyas,
Ahmadiyas] by Society and Authorities; State Protection.”
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2016/07/08/ind105313.e.pdf
Ispahani, Farahnaz. 2017a. Purifying the Land of the Pure: A History of Pakistan’s Religious
Minorities. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
———. 2017b. Purifying the Land of the Pure: A History of Pakistan’s Religious Minorities.
Oxford University Press.
Jalal, Ayesha. 2000. Self and Sovereignty Individual and Community in South Asian Islam since
1850. New York: Routlege.
Jenkins, Philip. 2002. The next Christendom the Coming of Global Christianity. Oxford:
University Press.
———. 2009. God’s Continent: Christianity, Islam, and Europe’s Religious Crisis. Place of
publication not identified: Oxford University Press Incorporated.
Khan, Adil Hussain. 2015. From Sufism to Ahmadiyya: A Muslim Minority Movement in South
Asia. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Lavan, Spencer. 1973. The Ahmadiyah Movement: A History and Perspective. Delhi: Manohar
Book Service.
Lawoti, Mahendra. 2017. “Secularism, or Not? Religion, State and Democracy in South Asia.”
Society and Culture in South Asia 3 (2): 268–79.
https://doi.org/10.1177/2393861717703856.
Mahmood, Saba. 2012. “Religious Freedom, the Minority Question, and Geopolitics in the
Middle East.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 54 (2): 418–446.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417512000096.
Malik, Lal Khan. 2013. “The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community in Canada.” The Review of
Religions, January 30, 2013. https://www.reviewofreligions.org/8582/the-ahmadiyyamuslim-community-in-canada/.
Manchanda, Rita. 2009. The No Nonsense Guide to Minority Rights in South Asia. Los Angeles:
Sage Publications Pvt. Ltd.
https://libproxy.wlu.ca/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&Au
thType=ip,cookie,url,uid&db=e000xna&AN=305691&site=ehost-live.
Mansbridge, Peter. 2016. “Leader of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community - YouTube.” One on
One. Toronto, Canada. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=adddiIYlBSA.
Martin, Baumann. 2009. “Migration and Religion.” In The World’s Religions: Continuities and
Transformations, edited by Peter B. Clarke, 1. published, 338–53. London: Routledge.
Mufti, Aamir. 2007. Enlightenment in the Colony: The Jewish Question and the Crisis of
Postcolonial Culture. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
Munir, Justice. 1954. Report of The Court of Inquiry Constituted under Punjab Act II Of 1954 to
Enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953. Suprintendent, Government Printing,
Punjab. https://www.thepersecution.org/dl/report_1953.pdf.
50

“Muslims Only.” 2015. Thestar.Com. August 26, 2015.
https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2015/08/26/disabled-man-told-subsidized-housing-isfor-muslims-only.html.
Nijhawan, Michael. 2016. The Precarious Diasporas of Sikh and Ahmadiyya Generations:
Violence, Memory, and Agency. Palgrave Macmillan US.
Riegel, O. W. 1935. “Propaganda and the Press.” The Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 179 (May): 201–10.
Saeed, Sadia. 2010. “Politics of Exclusion: Muslim Nationalism, State Formation and Legal
Representations of the Ahmadiyya Community in Pakistan.” Ph.D., United States -Michigan: University of Michigan.
https://search.proquest.com/docview/852627433/abstract/6F9A80FD02E1469EPQ/1.
———. 2013. “Desecularisation as an Instituted Process: National Identity and Religious
Difference in Pakistan.” Economic and Political Weekly, no. 12/14/2013.
https://www.academia.edu/6216776/Desecularisation_as_an_Instituted_Process_National
_Identity_and_Religious_Difference_in_Pakistan.
Sahin, Sehriban. 2001. “The Alevi Movement: Transformation from Secret Oral to Public
Written Culture in National and Transnational Social Spaces.” Ph.D., United States -New York: New School for Social Research.
http://search.proquest.com/docview/304708910/abstract/726AB2FB1AA4400FPQ/1.
Selby, Jennifer A., Amélie Barras, and Lori G. Beaman. 2018. Beyond Accommodation:
Everyday Narratives of Muslim Canadians. Vancouver, BC: UBC Press.
Shankland, David. 2003. The Alevis in Turkey: The Emergence of a Secular Islamic Tradition.
London ; RoutledgeCurzon.
Smith, Wilfred Cantwell. 1943. Modern Islam in India. Minerva Book Shop, Lahore.
Soennecken, Dagmar. 2009. “The Growth of Judicial Power over the Fate of Refugees: A
Comparison of Canada and Germany.” Toronto: University of Toronto.
https://search.proquest.com/docview/305109753?accountid=15090.
Stepan, Alfred. 2011. “The Multiple Secularism of Modern Democratic and Non-Democratic
Regimes.” In Rethinking Secularism, 114–41. New York: Oxford University Press.
Tahir Ahmad, Mirza. 1986. MUST WATCH Mirza Tahir Ahmad in Canada - YouTube. Toronto,
Canada. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jkd3b1Vp17w.
Tanveer, Rana. 2013. “Ahmadi-Owned Magazine’s Office under Siege.” The Express Tribune.
June 14, 2013. https://tribune.com.pk/story/562923/ahmadi-owned-magazines-officeunder-siege/.
———. 2016. The Express Tribune. December 7, 2016.
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1255832/ctd-raids-headquarters-ahmadis-rabwa/.
Tanveer, Rana, and Abdul Manan. 2010. “Over 88 Killed in Twin Gun-and-Bomb Attacks.” The
Express Tribune, May 28, 2010, sec. Punjab. http://tribune.com.pk/story/17105/over-88killed-in-twin-gun-and-bomb-attacks.
Virani, Shafique N. 2011. “Taqiyya and Identity in a South Asian Community.” The Journal of
Asian Studies 70 (1): 99–139. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021911810002974.
Watch, Human Rights. 2005. “Bangladesh: Breach of Faith: II. History of the Ahmadiyya
Community.” https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/bangladesh0605/3.htm.
Zine, Jasmin, Fatima Chakroun, and Shifa Abbas. 2019. “Canadian Muslim Voting Guide:
Federal Election 2019,” 34.

51

